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Abstract 
Corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have established themselves as prominent tools for 
corporate strategy. Consequently more and more organizations direct their attention towards the 
potential benefits of an M&A and the problems of leveraging these potentials. Governing and 
managing enterprise systems (ES) integration in M&A means understanding how ES integration 
relates to the M&A context and act upon the environmental pressure on the integration solution. We 
present a six dimensional framework for ES integration in corporate M&A by integrating previous 
research on M&A and ES integration. We also present and discuss the ES integration in a corporate 
M&A: The Trelleborg AB’s acquisition of CMP/Kléber Industrie. Trough the combination of the 
framework’s dimensions, the dynamics of different parts of the M&A process is captured. We suggest 
that the framework may be used in further research to build cumulative knowledge about how to 
govern and manage ES integration in M&A. We also suggest that the framework can be used by firms 
in their acquisitions as it shows, through the combination of dimensions, ES integration issues, 
decisions, and actions a firm has to consider in acquisition processes. 







Acquisitions of companies of varying size have become a prominent part of Trelleborg AB’s corporate 
strategy. During the last ten years, more than 50 acquisitions have been carried through, and for the 
future it is expected that the industry group will continue its acquisitions with a pace of 5-10 
acquisitions yearly. The act of acquisition has turned out to be a difficult and risky process. Not only 
because of difficulties predicting which synergetic effects that could logically be possible while 
joining two organizational units, but also since potential synergies have proven difficult to leverage in 
reality. As a part in the revealing of synergetic potential Trelleborg has experienced that enterprise 
systems (ES) integration plays a significant role. The organizational integration cannot be effectuated 
without successfully integrating the units ES.  
The problems faced by Trelleborg should not be unique in their kind. The act of acquisition has during 
the last decade become a prominent tool for corporate strategy worldwide (Sirower 2003). In 2004 the 
total number of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) reached 33 500 operations (9 000 involving EU 
targets and 9 100 US), purchase price of 1 900 billion euros (EC 2005). That sum amounts to some 
25% of US GDP, just as a comparison. Consequently more and more organizations direct their 
attention towards the potential benefits of an M&A and the problems of leveraging these potentials. In 
this action ES and ES integration have been found having a significant role (Giacomazzi et al. 1997; 
McKiernan & Merali 1995; Stylianou et al. 1996). 
A substantial body of literature exist that treats different aspects of the M&A act and ES integration. 
However, research that takes a more comprehensive view on the managerial considerations in the 
whole M&A process is still in its formative stages. Such a view is needed to capture the dynamics 
between different parts of the ES integration process and to explain how different aspects of the 
integration mutually affect each others. 
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, based on a literature review, develop a framework for ES 
integration in corporate M&As by integrating previous research on M&As and ES integration. Second, 
use the framework to present and discuss the ES integration in a corporate M&A: The Trelleborg AB’s 
acquisition of CMP/Kléber Industrie. The developed framework can be used to study ES integration in 
corporate M&As as by using the framework comparative studies can be done and cumulative 
knowledge can be developed. The framework can also be used by firms in their acquisitions as it 
shows through the combination of dimensions ES integration issues, decisions, and actions a firm has 
to consider in acquisition processes. 
The case in the article is based on a study where we and the Swedish industry group Trelleborg AB 
jointly studied Trelleborg’s acquisition and integration of a French industrial unit from the Michelin 
group. Empirical data was gathered through a dozen interviews with managers and informed key 
employees and on-spot observations. Interviews and observations were based on and guided by the 
framework presented later in this article and the case serves as an exemplification of the framework’s 
application. The study covers the acquisition and integration work during a ten year period from 
management perspective on ES, beginning with the initiation of the deal in 1996 until 2005, when 
integration has reached a stable level.  
The article is organized as follows: this first introduction has given the background for focusing ES 
integration in corporate M&As. The following section presents a framework for studying ES 
integration in M&A. It is followed by the case study: the acquisition of Kléber Industries by 
Trelleborg AB and related ES integration. Based on the study, the final section presents and discusses 
the potential application of the framework and suggests improvements. It also suggests future research 
needs in order to establish the framework as a comprehensive and reliable view of managerial 
questions of ES integration in M&As. 
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2 RESEARCH ON M&A AND ES: SIX DIMENSIONS FOR 
DESCRIBING ES INTEGRATION IN M&A 
Most observers agree that M&As are loosely defined processes that are driven by a complex pattern of 
motives, and no single approach can render a full account (Trautwein 1990). As the M&A act has 
become an increasingly more frequent action in the business community, research on the topic has 
increased. Through the years, the stack of related literature has grown steady, addressing the 
phenomenon in terms of, for example, strategic potential, organizational fit, cultural match, human 
reactions, financial fit and also, but to less extent, in terms of ES and ES integration. The ES pile 
already includes frameworks for evaluating IS success in M&A (Alaranta 2005; Kumar et al. 2002), 
assessing IT integration decisions (Mehta & Hirschheim 2004), and ERP implementations in relation 
to mergers (Alaranta 2005). However, these frameworks are either specifically limited to one 
theoretical perspective and/or limited to one of many managerial aspects of ES integration in M&A.  
The above mentioned frameworks, additional literature on ES in M&A (e.g. Buck-Lew et al. 1992; 
Giacomazzi et al. 1997; Hwang 2004; McKiernan & Merali 1995; Robbins & Stylianou 1999; 
Stylianou et al. 1996) and supplementary investigation of related publications suggest there are six 
emerging research streams that address different aspects of ES integration in M&A expressesing 
managerial issues that have to be considered during the M&A process. These six streams are 
synergetic potential, degree of integration, integration architecture, ES type, intention and reaction, 
and ES integration role. In the following paragraphs their characteristics as dimensions in a 
descriptive framework for ES integration in M&A and their supporting literature are discussed.  
2.1 Dimension A: Synergetic potential 
The concept of synergy is fundamental to understanding the rational reasons to why corporations 
participate in merger activities, as synergies in this context are defined as what is occurring when two 
units can be run more efficiently and/or more effectively together than apart (Lubatkin 1983). The 
literature describes three basic types of synergies as possible outcomes of mergers: technical 
economies, pecuniary economies and diversification economies (Lubatkin 1983). Technical economies 
are scale economies that occur when the physical processes inside the firm are altered so that the same 
amounts of inputs produce a higher quantity of output, or the same quantity of output is produced 
using fever resources. Pecuniary economies correspond to the firm’s capability to dictate market prices 
by making use of market power achieved primarily by size. Finally, diversification economies are 
achieved by improving the firm’s performance relative to its risk attributes, meaning to spread risk 
among unrelated markets and products trough a strategic product portfolio (Lubatkin 1983). 
M&A typologies based on strategic fit have the synergetic potential as common point of reference 
(e.g. Federal Trade Commission 1975; Larsson 1990). The American Federal Trade Commission 
(1975) suggested a classification scheme for acquisitions that has been a common starting point for 
many strategy researchers (Risberg 1999). The scheme classifies M&A into horizontal, vertical, 
product extension, market extension, and conglomerate categories. In horizontal mergers the two 
involved organizations produce one or more closely related products or services to the same market 
(Buono & Bowditch 1989). The rationale behind this kind of M&A is mostly related to technical 
economies (Lubatkin 1983). Vertical M&As are also driven by technical economies and a desire to 
reduce uncertainties in the corporation’s environment (Lubatkin 1983). In these M&As, the two 
involved parts have potential buyer-seller relationship (Buono & Bowditch 1989). M&As of the 
product extension category means the combination of two corporations that have related, but not 
directly competing products (Buono & Bowditch 1989). Potential synergies are found in overhead 
costs, distribution and marketing (Lubatkin 1983). The last category of M&A is the unrelated 
category, referred to as conglomerate M&A, a category in which motivation normally are related to 
financial synergies and risk reduction.  
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2.2 Dimension B: Degree of integration  
To actually leverage the synergetic potential of an M&A the two organizations must be integrated in 
some way (unless it is an unrelated M&A). Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) found in their studies that 
the transformation in an M&A could be sorted into four categories: holding, preservation, symbiosis, 
and absorption. The two dimensions in Figure 0, strategic interdependence and organizational 
autonomy, were found being the two most important drivers for deciding integration approach in a 
study by the two researchers. Holding represent an approach where the acquired unit was left 
undisturbed. Preservation includes partial integration of the new entity. Symbiosis refers to a situation 
where acquirer and acquired (or the entities in a merger) was equally transformed to fit each other. 
Finally, absorption was the complete incorporation of an acquired unit into the acquiring organization. 
As the general organizational integration sets the context for related ES integration the first dimension 
of the framework should be the M&A integration typology by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991). 
2.3 Dimension C: Integration architecture 
There is not one single way to carry out IT integration. Figure 0 depicts three alternatives. The first 
solution is a point-to-point alternative, where a software bridge, also known as interface, connects two 
applications directly to each other. Data from one application, A, is more or less automatically 
transferred to another application, B. If there is a need to integrate a third application, C, two new 
interfaces have to be built connecting A and B respectively. If a forth application needs to 
communicate with the three others, three new interfaces need to be created, and so on… It is easy to 
imagine the complexity of such a system if many entities need to communicate with each other.  
To decrease complexity, an approach that uses an intermediate layer between applications and 
databases called middleware can be used. Applications are modified to call the middleware, M, instead 
of calling each other directly. The middleware in turn calls targeted applications or databases. As a 
consequence each unit only needs two interfaces, one outgoing and one ingoing, to the middleware.  
The third alternative is to adopt an enterprise-wide system, E, often referred to as enterprise system or 
ERP (enterprise resource planning) system (Markus 2000). In these systems the different applications 
employ a shared database. The result is that all applications’ data is updated simultaneously, since they 










Figure 0. Integration typology based on integration degree. (Haspeslagh & Jemison 1991, p. 145)  
 
Figure 0. Three approaches to IT-integration (Markus 2000).  
 






actually are using the same data. Although real-world settings usually consist of combinations, these 
idealized architectures enables a descriptive analysis of the architectural solution chosen in an 
integration attempt.  
2.4 Dimension D: ES type  
It has been noticed several times that the IT artifact in itself is so complex and differentiated that also 
the nature of the IT artifact must considered when discussing managerial and organizational aspects of 
IT (e.g. Orlikowski & Iacono 2001). When it comes to ES it has been recognized that the term ES may 
refer to a number of fundamentally different systems that all need to be considered individually. Just 
as acquisitions and acquisitions were argued fundamentally different from each others, different types 
of ES and different parts of one ES are affected differently and have different effect on the M&A. 
Instead of focusing on the systems’ technology, we argue, drawing on Weill and Broadbent (1998), 
that a differentiation founded on the systems function is more appropriate when it is not the 
technology itself, but its possibility to contribute to the business of the organization (in this case to 
complete the integration), that should consist the foundation of an ES. Weill and Broadbent (1998) 
divides ES into Infrastructure, Transaction, Information, and Security ES. Infrastructural ES is basic 
technology that consist the information road network. Servers, cables, software that permits 
information flow. Within the category of Transaction ES is, for example, sales systems and book 
keeping software included. Transaction refers to business transactions. A decision support system 
serving managers with information on sales figures or customer satisfaction is an Information ES. 
Finally, Security ES are hardware, software and processes created to protect other ES from abuse. 
2.5 Dimension E: Intention and reactions 
Content oriented research (c.f. Mohr 1982) dominates both the M&A and ES fields and consequently 
the theoretical foundation for defining process oriented dimensions is more limited. One M&A 
typology that recognizes that M&A integration does not always follow the same pattern is the 
Hostility-Friendliness continuum, originally developed by Pritchet (1985). One extreme of the 
continuum is labelled “Friendly” and the other extreme is labelled “Hostile” (Figure 0). The friendliest 
form of acquisition is the organizational rescue. Generally, this type of M&A is well perceived by the 
target. The next degree of M&A friendliness is a collaboration. This is to the nature more of a neutral 
merger than an acquisition. The objective is to reach a fair deal for both companies, but some of the 
problems that arise are related to the way in which the combination is communicated to personnel and 
the inability to follow up on hasty promises (Buono & Bowditch 1989). In contested combinations 
only one of the companies wants the deal, or the companies would prefer completely different 
arrangements (Buono & Bowditch 1989). Finally, raids are the most hostile type of M&A (Buono & 
Bowditch 1989). During raids, one company takes over another by bypassing management and 
directly asking shareholders to sell their shares (Buono & Bowditch 1989).   
2.6 Dimension F: ES integration role  
Although many authors regard integration as a post-M&A issue, processes that are meant to end in 
integrated organizations can be traced back to well before the M&A deal is closed. McKiernan and 
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Merali (1995) argue that an important distinction to understand ES integration in M&A is whether ES 
integration is a post-M&A issue, dealt with reactively, or an early issue on the agenda, used 
proactively to maximize chances for positive outcome. McKiernan and Merali (1995) argue that 
currently ES integration is by managers considered as a post-M&A issue, dealt with reactively. 
However, according to the authors it should be an early issue on the agenda, used proactively to 
maximize chances for positive outcome 
2.7 The complete framework 
The complete framework is presented in Figure 0. In the very centre is the ES integration in M&A 
surrounded by the six dimensions that are useful to classify, describe, understand, and act upon an 
M&A process. All integration activities have at least one value in each dimension, but larger projects 
naturally span over many of the attributes.  
Above are described the internal sides of the dimension, but the literature also suggest a number of 
relationships between the dimensions: 
a. Synergetic potential – Degree of integration: The degree and mode of integration should be 
dependent on synergies expected as higher levels of integration is resource demanding 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison 1991). 
b. Synergetic potential – ES integration role: A proactive use of ES integration enables more 
accurate synergy estimation and possibly identification of supplementary synergies 
(McKiernan & Merali 1995).  
c. Degree of integration – Intention and reactions: Resistance among employees may cause 
integration problems (Buono & Bowditch 1989).  
d. Integration architecture – ES type: If the ES is business critical then integrating with point-to-
point or middleware could be preferred in favour of an enterprise wide system (Markus 2000).  
e. Integration architecture – ES integration role: A reactive approach is likely to transform 
existing system rather than replacing them (McKiernan & Merali 1995). 
Recognizing the individual value of each dimension and additionally the combined potential to 
illuminate dynamics and relationships between different aspects of ES integration in M&A, we 
suggest that the framework may be used for several purposes including: 
  Describe how different key aspects of M&As and ES integration are related and how they 
mutually affect each other leading to a final outcome.  
  Describe and understand how initial conditions and the integration process management 
jointly create the integration solution.  
  Understand both how a specific integration-related work task fits into a greater context as well 
as the nature and complexity of a comprehensive integration project. 
  Conduct comparable case-studies that take into account the same aspects of several cases and 
enables accumulation of knowledge on M&As. 
  Focus attention of researchers and firms involved in M&A on the process’ key aspects. 
  Facilitate for firms to realize ES integration issues, decisions, and actions a firm has to 
consider in acquisition processes 
3 MANAGING ES INTEGRATION AT TRELLEBORG AB  
Trelleborg AB is a global industry group with some 22 000 employees in about 30 countries. Annual 
sales are of approximately $3 billion. The head office is still located in the small city Trelleborg, in the 
very south of Sweden. The corporation is focused towards processed polymer materials: “Based on its 
extensive knowledge of polymer technology, markets and customers, Trelleborg develops, 
manufactures and markets functionally oriented products, systems and services.” (Trelleborg 2003, p. 
3). During the latter part of the 1990s, the corporation was restructured and a new corporate strategy 
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was developed. The strategy adopted was termed ”concentration and expansion”. Divestment of 
operations considered non-core created a strong financial position. ”Expansion” meant that the Group 
would utilize substantial amounts of its financial resources for external growth. As one consistuent 
part in the new strategy Trelleborg AB purchased CMP/Kléber Industrie from the international French 
Michelin group in 1996. The acquisition will in this section be presented using the framework 
introduced in the last section.  
3.1 Dimension A: Synergetic potential – Technical economies 
The two companies were potential competitors although not present at the same markets, meaning that 
the M&A was primarily a market extension. However, whereas Trelleborg had a strong market 
position in the Scandinavian countries, but weak in the rest of Europe, CMP/Kléber Industrie had a 
strong position in France, Italy and Southern Europe. It was expected that some of the two companies 
products that where direct competitive products would be produced jointly, thereby enabling larger 
volumes, enabling lower production prices per unit (economies of scale). For those products that were 
not direct substitute products, it was estimated that the acquisition would open up new markets and 
thus generate greater sales.  
3.2 Dimension B: Degree of integration – Symbiosis 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) proposed a differentiation of integration in M&A into four categories: 
holding, preservation, symbiosis, and absorption. Regarding the initial post-acquisition strategy plans, 
the objective at Trelleborg was to make an absorption but the final outcome would turn out to be a 
symbiosis. To leverage these synergetic effects, the two independent units needed to be integrated and 
it was decided to create a new unit within the Trelleborg group consisting of the acquired CMP/Kléber 
Industrie and the corresponding unit from the Trelleborg group. The new business unit was named 
Trelleborg Industrial Hose (TIH). As Trelleborg was the acquirer, a Swedish management team was 
installed and Swedish business practice was introduced into the new unit. For example, it was decided 

























































although the Trelleborg group was substantially larger than the Kléber unit, the relation was the 
opposite within TIH. Whilst 600 persons worked at the old Kléber site at Clermont-Ferrand, only 200 
worked for TIH in Trelleborg. Also, some production where transformed to Clermont-Ferrand to fully 
profit from the scale advantages. At the time of writing, the management team is now based in France, 
consisting of only originally French people. As a consequence the integration has become more 
oriented towards the idealized symbiosis type, rather than the absorption that was planned for. The 
TIH unit has partly because of the synergies created in the acquisition managed to turn red figures into 
profit, saving the two production sites from closure.  
The change from absorption to symbiosis did have effects on how the ES were integrated. The two 
first years when TIH had a Swedish management integration projects were carried out by Swedish 
people, large product groups who tried to reach consensus in important decisions, and Swedish 
suppliers were most often chosen. After 1998 when the new management team was installed both the 
way of managing and the preferred way to do integration changed. The next dimension of the 
framework, the choice of integration architecture, illuminates this turnaround.  
3.3 Dimension C: Integration architecture – Enterprise wide 
The Swedish management team installed after the acquisition faced a rather complex IT infrastructure. 
At the Clerment-Ferrand site an ERP system developed in-house, called Bergounix, was running and 
in all the different countries where CMP/Kléber was represented by sales organizations were 
individual ERP installations found. The former Trelleborg part of the unit used the ERP systems 
Movex, from Intentia, in all countries, but also here every country had in reality its individual 
installation of the system. Decision was made to replace all Bergounix installations with Movex 
installations. Although these new systems would all be Movex systems, it was not one single system 
being implemented, but rather seven different instances. Different strategies, including both point-to-
point and middleware solutions, where considered regarding how to integrate the systems. After all 
country managers had been questioned regarding the new systems functionality requirements 
consultants from Intentia along with Trelleborg employees calculated efforts needed to implement the 
new systems. The result was some 1000 consulting days.  
The date when these cost calculations where finished was by end of 1998. At the same time a new, 
French, manager was hired who reorganized the management team and installed a number of new 
persons at key positions. Together they decided that the proposed development of a new system would 
be too expensive, but also too risky considering that the existing Bergounix system would not make it 
trough the Y2K-problem. The new management decided to modify the existing system in order to 
survive the millennium shift and search for other options. 
At 1998 TIH continuously struggled with extensive losses and weak sales. Therefore the management 
team decided to reorganize its sales structure. Instead of having individual sales-companies with 
individual stock locations, ERP installation, book keeping etc, in each country where it was 
represented it was decided that only one invoicing company would exist and only three stock locations 
should exist. National companies were transformed to sales organizations. In order to achieve this new 
organizational structure, national centres needed to be fully integrated with the stock locations, 
production facilities and logistics departments. It was thus decided to eliminate the national ERP 
installations and make them use the same systems as was used in Clermont-Ferrand. At this time still 
the modified Bergounix system. Later on the Bergounix system was replaced by a Movex installation. 
The Bergounix system never became an enterprise-wide system. It was enterprise-wide in the old 
Kléber unit, but former Trelleborg parts were never included in that system. However, during 2005, 
also the old Trelleborg factory switched from one individual Movex installation to using the 
enterprise-wide system and 10 years after the acquisition the new unit had become integrated in terms 
of IT system.  
The relation between the change in general integration approach, from absorption to symbiosis, and IT 
integration architecture is apparent, but the question is “why?”. Our interviews provided insightful 
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information that contributes to that question being answered. While the Trelleborg group was trying to 
complete an absorption they were focusing other ES functionality than the new French management 
did. The group management did, to a higher degree than the TIH management, focus information 
flows vertically in the organization. On the other hand, the French TIH management had the TIH unit 
as primary horizon and more deeply involved in the daily business they considered to focus on the 
transaction ES. 
3.4 Dimension D: ES type 
During the 10 years that has passed since the acquisition integration efforts have been directed towards 
all four kinds of ES but to different extent.  
  Infrastructure – Very little new infrastructural ES has been developed to facilitate the 
integration. The transformation of national companies into sales centers demanded more 
communication within the organization and also more elaborated ES infrastructure. However, 
the IT needed to do so already existed within the Trelleborg group. From a TIH perspective, it 
was more or less just a matter of plug in the cables and make a phone call to achieve the 
communication line. 
  Transaction – Transaction ES has been one major integration focus. The new organization as 
well as the joint production where the two production units should be used more efficiently 
demanded more transactions between the different parts of the organization. As explained 
above, this was essential to leverage the synergetic potential of the deal and was solved with 
the enterprise-wide system. As explained above, integration of transaction ES received higher 
priority when managers more deeply involved in the daily business became in charge of ES 
integration activity.  
  Information – Information oriented ES was not a primary target for the integration activities 
that has been undertaken until now. However, some functionality came automatically with the 
new enterprise-wide system, for example delivery times and detailed sales figures. In addition 
a number of minor projects have been initiated in order to increase the visibility further, for 
example use of production facilities. 
  Security – Security ES has been integrated as a consequence of all TIH system being 
centralized. However, there is pressure from the Trelleborg Group to further standardize and 
integrate security systems in the whole group. Interestingly this is basically the only ES 
integration taking place between the old Kléber unit and the Trelleborg group, except from 
linkage with the corresponding unit explained in this article.  
In 1998 it became clear which level of ES integration that was needed in order to leverage the 
synergetic potential of the M&A and to enable future business activities. The need of transaction ES 
made an integration architecture based on point-to-point or middleware too complicated. Instead the 
solution of an enterprise wide system was chosen. 
3.5 Dimension F: Intention – Collaboration 
Describing the acquisition process in terms of Buono and Bowditch’ (1989) intention typology is 
somewhat difficult as the process includes elements that are typical for at least three of the categories. 
In 1996 the Kléber unit was struggling financially. One potential outcome of the minor crisis was a 
closure of the factory. Regarding the acquisition from that viewpoint, the appropriate category would 
be “Rescue”. But what is also to known is that the financial situation was equivalent at the Trelleborg 
site. The discussions before the acquisition were about either divesting the unit or invest and try to 
make it profitable. Regarding what Buono and Bowditch (1989) say would trigger the “rescue”-
reaction it is very likely that this may have affected the acquisition and post-acquisition integration 
process. Trelleborg was not a profitable company coming to rescue with superior knowledge on how 
to do the business. Rather, both companies were at same levels and needed a new strategy. Therefore, 
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the most appropriate category to sort the acquisition into would be to “Collaboration”. However, as the 
two units were directly interchangeable in many aspects it was, in still is, a natural contest and rivalry 
between the two sites. A characteristic that is typical for the category of “Contested Combination”.  
This natural rivalry between the two units has been prevalent in all ES integration projects and thus 
has become a management challenge. The intention is related to all of the prior dimensions. To 
integration, A1, as the turn from rescue to collaboration is parallel to the change from absorption to 
symbiosis. Further, the collaboration is reflected in the choice of IT integration architecture and the 
priority shift in ES functionality.  
3.6 Dimension F: ES integration role – Reactively 
The second process oriented dimension is adapted from McKiernan and Merali (1995). The authors 
argue that an important distinction to understand ES integration in M&A is whether ES integration is a 
post-M&A issue, dealt with reactively, or an early issue on the agenda, used proactively to maximize 
chances for positive outcome. McKiernan and Merali (1995) suggested that ES integration should be 
used proactively rather than reactively in acquisitions, meaning that it should be a pre-acquisition issue 
rather than a post-acquisition issue. In the TIH case there is no doubt ES integration was a post-
acquisition concern. Which also lead to some problems directly after the acquisition when the 
management had some difficulties finding the right integration mode. However, in this case it did not 
turn out to be a deal-breaker that should had stopped the process, but it easy to see that the integration 
could had been smother if the units would had been better prepared. As example, TIH recently made a 
new acquisition itself, acquiring the small hi-tech company Dynaflex. The integration of this unit 
became very smooth as only a few adjustments had to be made in order to include the Dynaflex unit 
into the enterprise wide system. The old Dynaflex site at Orleans, France, is now a third production 
unit within the system. If Trelleborg at the time of 1996 would have had a similar system it would had 
been easier to include the new factory and new sales offices in the existing system. 
As the role of ES integration has been reactive the ES integration efforts have changed along with the 
other dimensions. As the management changed, so did also the desired ES integration. The integration 
objective has evolved to support business objectives, for example the above described rationalization 
of national companies to sales organizations. Today, ES integration has a more active role which 
permits acquisition of more absorption nature, such as the acquisition of Dynaflex. 
4 CONCLUSION, TRENDS AND GUIDELINES 
In this article we developed a framework for ES integration in M&A. The framework was used to 
describe and explain an ES integration in a large firm. Using the framework we explained how a 
number of characteristics were related to each other and mutually affected the development of the 
integration process and the final integration outcome. It was shown that no single approach can in 
itself give a complete explanation to the development, but by combining existing models into a 
comprehensive framework most aspects of the integration may be explained. The framework has a 
managerial focus and has both a content and process focus. Although, the framework was used to 
describe an integration process we think the framework can also be used to help managers involved in 
ES integration in M&A. It will help mangers focus critical issues and gives alternative ways to address 
issues and problems. 
By integrating the framework’s dimensions we were able to dicern six suggested dependencies that 
later were confirmed in the empirical case: 
a. Synergetic potential – Degree of integration: The degree and mode of integration should be 
dependent on synergies expected as higher levels of integration is resource demanding 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison 1991). 
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b. Synergetic potential – ES integration role: A proactive use of ES integration enables more 
accurate synergy estimation and possibly identification of supplementary synergies 
(McKiernan & Merali 1995).  
c. Degree of integration – Intention and reactions: Resistance among employees may cause 
integration problems (Buono & Bowditch 1989).  
d. Integration architecture – ES type: If the ES is business critical then integrating with point-to-
point or middleware could be preferred in favour of an enterprise wide system (Markus 2000).  
e. Integration architecture – ES integration role: A reactive approach is likely to transform 
existing system rather than replacing them (McKiernan & Merali 1995). 
In addition the case suggests that there are further four relationships: 
f. Degree of integration – Integration architecture: Higher degrees of integration were not 
efficient to undertake with middleware architecture.  
g. Degree of integration – ES type: The symbiosis approach favoured other functionality than the 
absorption strategy.  
h. Degree of integration – ES role: Proactive use of integration enabled smooth absorption.  
i. Intention and reaction – ES type: Collaborating resulted in a different functionality focus.  
 
A number of trends related to ES integration in M&A are worth noting. First is the development of 
different types of process standards. Process standards are developed in different industries. One 
example is the work of the Supply-Chain Council, which is developing the Supply-Chain Operations 
Reference (SCOR) model. SCOR “lays out a top-level supply chain process in five key steps: plan, 
source, make, deliver, and return.” (Davenport 2005). The ERP-company SAP has begun to include 
SCOR flows and metrics in its supply chain software packages. Another approach is the The MIT 
Process Handbook Project (Malone et al. 2003). The project involved collecting examples of how 
organizations perform similar processes. The process on-line repository includes knowledge about 
over 5000 business processes and activities as well as tools to edit and view this knowledge repository 
(http://ccs.mit.edu/ph/). The Handbook has been used by, for example, Dow Corning Corporation in a 
major SAP implementation and project supply chain management project (Phios 1999). Yet another 
approach is the enterprise engineering/integration and the framework Generalised Enterprise 
Reference Architecture and Methodology (GERAM), which is a generalized framework for describing 
the components needed in all types of enterprise engineering and enterprise integration processes 
(Bernus & Nemes 2003) (see, also, http://www.cit.gu.edu.au/~bernus/taskforce/geram/versions/). 
These three examples and similar approaches of development of process knowledge and standards are 
likely to make ES integration easier.  
Another trend that will affect ES integration in M&A as well as ES integration in general is the 
development and increased use of Web services, Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), Enterprise 
Application Integration (EAI) and Enterprise Service Bus (ESB). These developments, as well as 
other, will from a technical view make integration and de-integration easier to accomplish and also 
make new integrations possible. Still, the managerial issues in the presented framework will be the 
same.  
Future research is needed on the suggested framework. This includes using the framework in actual ES 
integration in M&A processes. Further test of the validity of the framework is also needed.  
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